Aristotle's Metaphysics

Here is the second essay that I wrote for my oxford tutorial which is a critique of Aristotle's metaphysics. Almost all of the content is based on Aristotle's Metaphysics book I or Physics book I. All of the references are in parentheses.


In philosophy today, certain fundamental aspects of Aristotle’s metaphysics are still used almost universally among the western philosophical world. Aristotle addresses many topics covered by metaphysics; from causation, form and matter, the existence of mathematical numbers, to God, Aristotle leaves few rocks uncovered. The fundamentals of Aristotle’s metaphysics, specifically pertaining to his theology, in comparison to popular theology done simultaneously have led to what can be considered the most important inquiry one could make.
There is no denying that Aristotle deemed it a sacred duty to pursue knowledge, if not for the sake of knowledge itself (Met. A. I). Even without any practical ends, knowledge is good for its own sake. Nevertheless, there are it seems, different degrees of knowledge in terms of their importance. The highest of these degrees of knowledge is wisdom, which is found in pursuit of first and most universal cause (W. D. Ross, Aristotle, P. 154). Yet, what is the ‘first and most universal cause'? What is the final cause; the beginner of the infinite circle of time and movement; what is the ‘unmoved mover’? Though his view is considered less than orthodox, Aristotle inevitably reaches the conclusion of a God as the first and most universal cause.
In his mind, Aristotle thought that because there are ‘better’ things, there must be a ‘best’ thing, which must divine. Ontological arguments among theistic apologists today are greatly praised and used often. Perhaps one of the most popular ontological arguments for a theistic apologetic would be none other than the famous (or to some, the infamous) C. S. Lewis.
Lewis’s argument lies mainly in his works Surprised by Joy and Mere Christianity where the argument is portrayed more as a theme rather than a concise argument given in a one section in either if his books. Since then, his modern admirers have condensed the argument to a more concise version.
The argument can be stated in a short analogy as follows; a man who is starving in a desert may never find food or water and tragically perish. Even though he dies, he knows there must be water and food; they must exist, for how would his body know what to ‘need’ for him to need it in the first place? Likewise, there is a need for a God. We see good things and better things, so there must be a best thing, or preceding things so there must be a first thing to cause the next things. Even if we cannot know the divine in any way, we can know that the Divine exists according to Aristotle’s argument.
As stated above, Aristotle’s view of God is less than what most adopt as a proper definitive. (1) God’s incomprehension of evil, (2) the lack contingency to the Divine, and (3) unconscious teleology which ultimately leads to a non-‘created’ genesis are all aspect of which most theistic philosophers would deny in Aristotle’s theology. To review the first objection, if the Divine is the ultimate cause of Good, and evil is a travesty of that good, then it would be reasonable to say the Divine has no relation to evil on any level, and therefore has no knowledge of evil. Aristotle accepts this view as it completely separates the Divine from the perversion of good (Ib. 25, 32, 26), but is it necessary for the distinction? It seems that if these definitions of God and evil are true, then God could still have knowledge of evil and its results without being acquainted with it. In other words, God can know what evil is without having it as any of God’s attributes, which would, of course, destroy our definition of God.
The main point of which the Divine serves Aristotle is to satisfy the dilemma of the beginning of time and movement, but this does not lead Aristotle to a creation genesis (301 31, 279 12 ff). This inevitably calls for an unconscious teleology, which has no foundation or basis in the Divine even though God caused the infinite loop of time and movement. Aristotle’s notion of God seems to satisfy the void of the origin of space, but why does it not apply elsewhere? According to the concept of the first cause, would not the origin of sensible things also need an unmoved mover? Furthermore, it seems that if there were no purpose, meaning or intent, or rational behind the genesis of sensible things, then indeed reality would imply a ‘matter over mind’ state of hierarchy. If mindless matter is all there is, then the mindless is all there is, and therefore philosophy and the very rational logic used by Aristotle could not be trusted. This would mean that matter is superior to mind (if the mind would exist at all) and would imply observational science of sensible things superior to a prior knowledge, which would certainly not be excepted by Aristotelian standards, and would provide no presupposition basis for those sciences.
Aristotle further argues that the Divine is not concerned with any “practical interests in the world” because any of these practical interests would “detract from His perfection” (W. D. Ross, Aristotle, Page 184). Aristotle’s God must be perfect, and thus separated from any imperfection at all costs, but why must God not involve Himself with this world in a way that brings it closer to perfection, to be separated from imperfection? Hardly any rationally thinking human being would deny the imperfect state of which mankind lives in, which would suggest that God is not at work in the world. However, if God is really perfect, and He is all powerful (which seems to be an attribute Aristotle would deny) then must not he make this world perfect at some point in time by virtue of His perfection; must not He have a devised plan to make the imperfect perfect, and thus everything He does is for a greater end? And if He is not all powerful (in spite of His status as the unmoved mover), then must not He try to make the imperfect perfect and fail in the attempt; all this by virtue of His perfection?
Aristotle’s God certainly did satisfy the need for which he saw, but it is worth inquiry to why many other philosophers would deem his God is too narrow. We can look to the gospel account of Saint John as a comparison of a widely held belief. In the first verse of the first chapter that St. John wrote to the Gnostics, the author says that “In the beginning was the logos, and the logos was with God and the logos was God. He was with God in the beginning.” Then St. John goes on to claim something that Aristotle would have immediately rejected; “…He (Logos/God) was in the world, and the world was made through Him, and the world did not know Him. He came to His own, and His own did not receive Him.” To believe the view that not only does God dabble in the practicalities of this world but actually became one of this world, is to believe in a much different God then the God Aristotle produces. Aristotle did not hold the same theory of Forms as Plato did, and this belief written in the Christian gospels seem to imply them. According to the theory of Forms, an Idea is (1) everything essential for the object to be and (2) a perfect being of the object, then would not this Idea of humanness be a God-like being? If this theory of Forms is correct, then whatever (or whoever) this Idea of humanness is might not be so different from humans. Is it not essential to humanity to be a person? And to be a person, one must be capable of rational thought? If this is true, then the Idea of humanness must be a person, the object of whose Image humans reflect.
Alas, the reflection cannot see the object in the same way a shadow cannot see the sun. However if this God were all-powerful, perfect, and willful, then he would move to fix all imperfections by virtue of His perfection. Furthermore, would He not become the particular so as to give knowledge of the perfect form? For it is inconceivable for an imperfect being to become perfect by means of itself; but it seems more likely for the perfect being can become imperfect for a greater ends.
In the gospel of St. John it is taught that Jesus the Christ was this being who came from perfection into imperfection. When He was asked to “show them the Father,” Jesus responds, “Have I been with you so long, and yet you have not known me?” (John 14:9). This obviously implies that no one can know the Divine except by the means of the Divine incarnate. According to the Christian gospel, man was created to bear the Image of God (Genesis 1:26); is this not exactly what a form does for its particular? What’s more, is that this Form must also hold dominion over, or be in complete compatibility with all other Forms in the same way that humans hold dominion over, or can be compatible with sensible things, not because He reflects humans, but because humans reflect Him (Ibid.).
The argument could be raised however, that a misunderstanding of ‘perfection’ is applied to the scenario in that the Form makes the particular perfect. Of course, if a red haired human were the perfect human, then the brown haired humans could never be humans. However, the argument merely states the particulars become ‘like’ the Form by knowing the Form, not that the particulars ‘become’ the Form itself. Therefore, the particular can still obtain attributes that are not necessary for it to be itself and still be a made-perfect particular.
If all this is true, what then is more important than knowing this ‘God incarnate’? For indeed the highest degree of knowledge would be the wisdom gained by knowing the first and most universal cause. In other words, what then is more important than knowing the object of which we are to reflect? If this is true, then surely it must be the greatest discovery mankind has ever made. If this is false, then it is certainly the greatest lie ever told. Either way, it
is worth much inquiry.