Below is a commentary on the Babylonian account of creation vs. the Genesis account of creation.
Here is a link to the Babylonian Enuma Elish: http://www.crivoice.org/enumaelish.html
[Note: Due to different translations, the references to the text may not be 100% literal to the text provided by the link.]
Any culture’s account of humanity’s origin has determined who (or what) they believe God is, who man is, and how man should live. Because of this, Ancient Near Eastern writers often conflicted on the character of God (or gods) and the purpose of man in the annals of the birth of mankind. While the Genesis and Babylonian accounts of creation may have some similarities, further analysis reveals that the Sitz im Leben of the authors contradict each other in their theology and philosophy. The Babylonian account of creation differs most from the Genesis account in that it does not tell of a godhead that is unified under one mind or will, but rather, that they are divided and weak.
In the Enuma Elish, the author presents the first arc of tension in the fourteenth line when he introduces Anu to be the “rival” of his fathers. Here the reader learns that instead of being united, the gods struggle for power. Apsu and Tiamat, the father and mother of all, do not have complete sovereignty in which they command utter submission from the gods. The godhead Tiamat is not all-powerful, and if defeated, can be replaced.
This battle for power continues to rage and gives the gods “unrest”. As a result, Apsu asks Tiamat to join him in destroying the gods but the mother refuses and rebukes him. This implies that conflict not only lies between enemies, but also between two acquaintances (1). This division makes Apsu weak and a lesser god called “Ea” kills him. Angered by this, Tiamat confronts Ea’s son Marduk and they engage in combat.
In the sixty-first line, the author refers to Marduk as “lord” before the battle with Tiamat finishes. This referral to “lordship” (2) reveals two things: first, the reader knows that Marduk will be the victor, and second, the author expresses allegiance to the more powerful god. Because of this eternal struggle for power among the gods, an unchanging standard of morality does not exist. The King’s Word decrees what is “good” and as long as power shifts, what is morally acceptable will also shift. Instead of a consistent code of conduct, the reader finds that might makes right.
After Marduk slays his enemy and establishes his rule, he soon realizes the same problem that Apsu and Tiamat both experienced: restlessness still plagues the gods. They need someone to bring them peace because they cannot bring it themselves. Marduk executes Kingu who allegedly “contrived the uprising” and creates man out of the carnage. Here the reader learns that the chief end of man is to slave so that the gods may have rest. The gods made man because they were incomplete without man’ service.
The Enuma Elish describes the divine powers as being divided and always at war with themselves. This serves more to describe the history of the Babylonian reign and the transfer of power because it’s content describes human nature rather than Divine nature. The gods quarrel, never find peace, and need slaves to remedy their restlessness. In the Genesis account of creation however, God does not create man out of any need for Himself, but out of mere desire (Gen. 1:26 – 28). For the God of Genesis does not need the service of man to be complete. Unlike the Babylonian text, The Genesis account of creation offers a God whose unity and power cannot be parted (Gen. 1: 1-2) (3).
Notes
1. The text does not clarify whether Apsu and Tiamat were lovers or friends.
2. The text intentionally leaves the word “lord” without capitalization.
3. Although there is no simple reference in the Genesis creation account that says, “God was completely powerful and unified”, it is implied in the language. He merely speaks and existence obeys Him.
Monday, September 26, 2011
Thursday, June 9, 2011
Aristotle's Metaphysics
Here is the second essay that I wrote for my oxford tutorial which is a critique of Aristotle's metaphysics. Almost all of the content is based on Aristotle's Metaphysics book I or Physics book I. All of the references are in parentheses.
In philosophy today, certain fundamental aspects of Aristotle’s metaphysics are still used almost universally among the western philosophical world. Aristotle addresses many topics covered by metaphysics; from causation, form and matter, the existence of mathematical numbers, to God, Aristotle leaves few rocks uncovered. The fundamentals of Aristotle’s metaphysics, specifically pertaining to his theology, in comparison to popular theology done simultaneously have led to what can be considered the most important inquiry one could make.
There is no denying that Aristotle deemed it a sacred duty to pursue knowledge, if not for the sake of knowledge itself (Met. A. I). Even without any practical ends, knowledge is good for its own sake. Nevertheless, there are it seems, different degrees of knowledge in terms of their importance. The highest of these degrees of knowledge is wisdom, which is found in pursuit of first and most universal cause (W. D. Ross, Aristotle, P. 154). Yet, what is the ‘first and most universal cause'? What is the final cause; the beginner of the infinite circle of time and movement; what is the ‘unmoved mover’? Though his view is considered less than orthodox, Aristotle inevitably reaches the conclusion of a God as the first and most universal cause.
In his mind, Aristotle thought that because there are ‘better’ things, there must be a ‘best’ thing, which must divine. Ontological arguments among theistic apologists today are greatly praised and used often. Perhaps one of the most popular ontological arguments for a theistic apologetic would be none other than the famous (or to some, the infamous) C. S. Lewis.
Lewis’s argument lies mainly in his works Surprised by Joy and Mere Christianity where the argument is portrayed more as a theme rather than a concise argument given in a one section in either if his books. Since then, his modern admirers have condensed the argument to a more concise version.
The argument can be stated in a short analogy as follows; a man who is starving in a desert may never find food or water and tragically perish. Even though he dies, he knows there must be water and food; they must exist, for how would his body know what to ‘need’ for him to need it in the first place? Likewise, there is a need for a God. We see good things and better things, so there must be a best thing, or preceding things so there must be a first thing to cause the next things. Even if we cannot know the divine in any way, we can know that the Divine exists according to Aristotle’s argument.
As stated above, Aristotle’s view of God is less than what most adopt as a proper definitive. (1) God’s incomprehension of evil, (2) the lack contingency to the Divine, and (3) unconscious teleology which ultimately leads to a non-‘created’ genesis are all aspect of which most theistic philosophers would deny in Aristotle’s theology. To review the first objection, if the Divine is the ultimate cause of Good, and evil is a travesty of that good, then it would be reasonable to say the Divine has no relation to evil on any level, and therefore has no knowledge of evil. Aristotle accepts this view as it completely separates the Divine from the perversion of good (Ib. 25, 32, 26), but is it necessary for the distinction? It seems that if these definitions of God and evil are true, then God could still have knowledge of evil and its results without being acquainted with it. In other words, God can know what evil is without having it as any of God’s attributes, which would, of course, destroy our definition of God.
The main point of which the Divine serves Aristotle is to satisfy the dilemma of the beginning of time and movement, but this does not lead Aristotle to a creation genesis (301 31, 279 12 ff). This inevitably calls for an unconscious teleology, which has no foundation or basis in the Divine even though God caused the infinite loop of time and movement. Aristotle’s notion of God seems to satisfy the void of the origin of space, but why does it not apply elsewhere? According to the concept of the first cause, would not the origin of sensible things also need an unmoved mover? Furthermore, it seems that if there were no purpose, meaning or intent, or rational behind the genesis of sensible things, then indeed reality would imply a ‘matter over mind’ state of hierarchy. If mindless matter is all there is, then the mindless is all there is, and therefore philosophy and the very rational logic used by Aristotle could not be trusted. This would mean that matter is superior to mind (if the mind would exist at all) and would imply observational science of sensible things superior to a prior knowledge, which would certainly not be excepted by Aristotelian standards, and would provide no presupposition basis for those sciences.
Aristotle further argues that the Divine is not concerned with any “practical interests in the world” because any of these practical interests would “detract from His perfection” (W. D. Ross, Aristotle, Page 184). Aristotle’s God must be perfect, and thus separated from any imperfection at all costs, but why must God not involve Himself with this world in a way that brings it closer to perfection, to be separated from imperfection? Hardly any rationally thinking human being would deny the imperfect state of which mankind lives in, which would suggest that God is not at work in the world. However, if God is really perfect, and He is all powerful (which seems to be an attribute Aristotle would deny) then must not he make this world perfect at some point in time by virtue of His perfection; must not He have a devised plan to make the imperfect perfect, and thus everything He does is for a greater end? And if He is not all powerful (in spite of His status as the unmoved mover), then must not He try to make the imperfect perfect and fail in the attempt; all this by virtue of His perfection?
Aristotle’s God certainly did satisfy the need for which he saw, but it is worth inquiry to why many other philosophers would deem his God is too narrow. We can look to the gospel account of Saint John as a comparison of a widely held belief. In the first verse of the first chapter that St. John wrote to the Gnostics, the author says that “In the beginning was the logos, and the logos was with God and the logos was God. He was with God in the beginning.” Then St. John goes on to claim something that Aristotle would have immediately rejected; “…He (Logos/God) was in the world, and the world was made through Him, and the world did not know Him. He came to His own, and His own did not receive Him.” To believe the view that not only does God dabble in the practicalities of this world but actually became one of this world, is to believe in a much different God then the God Aristotle produces. Aristotle did not hold the same theory of Forms as Plato did, and this belief written in the Christian gospels seem to imply them. According to the theory of Forms, an Idea is (1) everything essential for the object to be and (2) a perfect being of the object, then would not this Idea of humanness be a God-like being? If this theory of Forms is correct, then whatever (or whoever) this Idea of humanness is might not be so different from humans. Is it not essential to humanity to be a person? And to be a person, one must be capable of rational thought? If this is true, then the Idea of humanness must be a person, the object of whose Image humans reflect.
Alas, the reflection cannot see the object in the same way a shadow cannot see the sun. However if this God were all-powerful, perfect, and willful, then he would move to fix all imperfections by virtue of His perfection. Furthermore, would He not become the particular so as to give knowledge of the perfect form? For it is inconceivable for an imperfect being to become perfect by means of itself; but it seems more likely for the perfect being can become imperfect for a greater ends.
In the gospel of St. John it is taught that Jesus the Christ was this being who came from perfection into imperfection. When He was asked to “show them the Father,” Jesus responds, “Have I been with you so long, and yet you have not known me?” (John 14:9). This obviously implies that no one can know the Divine except by the means of the Divine incarnate. According to the Christian gospel, man was created to bear the Image of God (Genesis 1:26); is this not exactly what a form does for its particular? What’s more, is that this Form must also hold dominion over, or be in complete compatibility with all other Forms in the same way that humans hold dominion over, or can be compatible with sensible things, not because He reflects humans, but because humans reflect Him (Ibid.).
The argument could be raised however, that a misunderstanding of ‘perfection’ is applied to the scenario in that the Form makes the particular perfect. Of course, if a red haired human were the perfect human, then the brown haired humans could never be humans. However, the argument merely states the particulars become ‘like’ the Form by knowing the Form, not that the particulars ‘become’ the Form itself. Therefore, the particular can still obtain attributes that are not necessary for it to be itself and still be a made-perfect particular.
If all this is true, what then is more important than knowing this ‘God incarnate’? For indeed the highest degree of knowledge would be the wisdom gained by knowing the first and most universal cause. In other words, what then is more important than knowing the object of which we are to reflect? If this is true, then surely it must be the greatest discovery mankind has ever made. If this is false, then it is certainly the greatest lie ever told. Either way, it
is worth much inquiry.
In philosophy today, certain fundamental aspects of Aristotle’s metaphysics are still used almost universally among the western philosophical world. Aristotle addresses many topics covered by metaphysics; from causation, form and matter, the existence of mathematical numbers, to God, Aristotle leaves few rocks uncovered. The fundamentals of Aristotle’s metaphysics, specifically pertaining to his theology, in comparison to popular theology done simultaneously have led to what can be considered the most important inquiry one could make.
There is no denying that Aristotle deemed it a sacred duty to pursue knowledge, if not for the sake of knowledge itself (Met. A. I). Even without any practical ends, knowledge is good for its own sake. Nevertheless, there are it seems, different degrees of knowledge in terms of their importance. The highest of these degrees of knowledge is wisdom, which is found in pursuit of first and most universal cause (W. D. Ross, Aristotle, P. 154). Yet, what is the ‘first and most universal cause'? What is the final cause; the beginner of the infinite circle of time and movement; what is the ‘unmoved mover’? Though his view is considered less than orthodox, Aristotle inevitably reaches the conclusion of a God as the first and most universal cause.
In his mind, Aristotle thought that because there are ‘better’ things, there must be a ‘best’ thing, which must divine. Ontological arguments among theistic apologists today are greatly praised and used often. Perhaps one of the most popular ontological arguments for a theistic apologetic would be none other than the famous (or to some, the infamous) C. S. Lewis.
Lewis’s argument lies mainly in his works Surprised by Joy and Mere Christianity where the argument is portrayed more as a theme rather than a concise argument given in a one section in either if his books. Since then, his modern admirers have condensed the argument to a more concise version.
The argument can be stated in a short analogy as follows; a man who is starving in a desert may never find food or water and tragically perish. Even though he dies, he knows there must be water and food; they must exist, for how would his body know what to ‘need’ for him to need it in the first place? Likewise, there is a need for a God. We see good things and better things, so there must be a best thing, or preceding things so there must be a first thing to cause the next things. Even if we cannot know the divine in any way, we can know that the Divine exists according to Aristotle’s argument.
As stated above, Aristotle’s view of God is less than what most adopt as a proper definitive. (1) God’s incomprehension of evil, (2) the lack contingency to the Divine, and (3) unconscious teleology which ultimately leads to a non-‘created’ genesis are all aspect of which most theistic philosophers would deny in Aristotle’s theology. To review the first objection, if the Divine is the ultimate cause of Good, and evil is a travesty of that good, then it would be reasonable to say the Divine has no relation to evil on any level, and therefore has no knowledge of evil. Aristotle accepts this view as it completely separates the Divine from the perversion of good (Ib. 25, 32, 26), but is it necessary for the distinction? It seems that if these definitions of God and evil are true, then God could still have knowledge of evil and its results without being acquainted with it. In other words, God can know what evil is without having it as any of God’s attributes, which would, of course, destroy our definition of God.
The main point of which the Divine serves Aristotle is to satisfy the dilemma of the beginning of time and movement, but this does not lead Aristotle to a creation genesis (301 31, 279 12 ff). This inevitably calls for an unconscious teleology, which has no foundation or basis in the Divine even though God caused the infinite loop of time and movement. Aristotle’s notion of God seems to satisfy the void of the origin of space, but why does it not apply elsewhere? According to the concept of the first cause, would not the origin of sensible things also need an unmoved mover? Furthermore, it seems that if there were no purpose, meaning or intent, or rational behind the genesis of sensible things, then indeed reality would imply a ‘matter over mind’ state of hierarchy. If mindless matter is all there is, then the mindless is all there is, and therefore philosophy and the very rational logic used by Aristotle could not be trusted. This would mean that matter is superior to mind (if the mind would exist at all) and would imply observational science of sensible things superior to a prior knowledge, which would certainly not be excepted by Aristotelian standards, and would provide no presupposition basis for those sciences.
Aristotle further argues that the Divine is not concerned with any “practical interests in the world” because any of these practical interests would “detract from His perfection” (W. D. Ross, Aristotle, Page 184). Aristotle’s God must be perfect, and thus separated from any imperfection at all costs, but why must God not involve Himself with this world in a way that brings it closer to perfection, to be separated from imperfection? Hardly any rationally thinking human being would deny the imperfect state of which mankind lives in, which would suggest that God is not at work in the world. However, if God is really perfect, and He is all powerful (which seems to be an attribute Aristotle would deny) then must not he make this world perfect at some point in time by virtue of His perfection; must not He have a devised plan to make the imperfect perfect, and thus everything He does is for a greater end? And if He is not all powerful (in spite of His status as the unmoved mover), then must not He try to make the imperfect perfect and fail in the attempt; all this by virtue of His perfection?
Aristotle’s God certainly did satisfy the need for which he saw, but it is worth inquiry to why many other philosophers would deem his God is too narrow. We can look to the gospel account of Saint John as a comparison of a widely held belief. In the first verse of the first chapter that St. John wrote to the Gnostics, the author says that “In the beginning was the logos, and the logos was with God and the logos was God. He was with God in the beginning.” Then St. John goes on to claim something that Aristotle would have immediately rejected; “…He (Logos/God) was in the world, and the world was made through Him, and the world did not know Him. He came to His own, and His own did not receive Him.” To believe the view that not only does God dabble in the practicalities of this world but actually became one of this world, is to believe in a much different God then the God Aristotle produces. Aristotle did not hold the same theory of Forms as Plato did, and this belief written in the Christian gospels seem to imply them. According to the theory of Forms, an Idea is (1) everything essential for the object to be and (2) a perfect being of the object, then would not this Idea of humanness be a God-like being? If this theory of Forms is correct, then whatever (or whoever) this Idea of humanness is might not be so different from humans. Is it not essential to humanity to be a person? And to be a person, one must be capable of rational thought? If this is true, then the Idea of humanness must be a person, the object of whose Image humans reflect.
Alas, the reflection cannot see the object in the same way a shadow cannot see the sun. However if this God were all-powerful, perfect, and willful, then he would move to fix all imperfections by virtue of His perfection. Furthermore, would He not become the particular so as to give knowledge of the perfect form? For it is inconceivable for an imperfect being to become perfect by means of itself; but it seems more likely for the perfect being can become imperfect for a greater ends.
In the gospel of St. John it is taught that Jesus the Christ was this being who came from perfection into imperfection. When He was asked to “show them the Father,” Jesus responds, “Have I been with you so long, and yet you have not known me?” (John 14:9). This obviously implies that no one can know the Divine except by the means of the Divine incarnate. According to the Christian gospel, man was created to bear the Image of God (Genesis 1:26); is this not exactly what a form does for its particular? What’s more, is that this Form must also hold dominion over, or be in complete compatibility with all other Forms in the same way that humans hold dominion over, or can be compatible with sensible things, not because He reflects humans, but because humans reflect Him (Ibid.).
The argument could be raised however, that a misunderstanding of ‘perfection’ is applied to the scenario in that the Form makes the particular perfect. Of course, if a red haired human were the perfect human, then the brown haired humans could never be humans. However, the argument merely states the particulars become ‘like’ the Form by knowing the Form, not that the particulars ‘become’ the Form itself. Therefore, the particular can still obtain attributes that are not necessary for it to be itself and still be a made-perfect particular.
If all this is true, what then is more important than knowing this ‘God incarnate’? For indeed the highest degree of knowledge would be the wisdom gained by knowing the first and most universal cause. In other words, what then is more important than knowing the object of which we are to reflect? If this is true, then surely it must be the greatest discovery mankind has ever made. If this is false, then it is certainly the greatest lie ever told. Either way, it
is worth much inquiry.
Plato's Theory of Ideas
Here is the first essay I wrote for my Oxford tutorial. It is on Plato's theory of Ideas which is mainly developed through the Republic.
In the Republic, Plato uses many different allegories, analogies, comparisons, diagrams, and images. Arguably the most famous of these is the allegory of the cave. Comparing shadows to statues and the Sun to real things, Plato defines the Idea of Forms. Although Plato’s allegory introduces the superior relevance of Ideas to sensible things, the allegory shows some fallacies in Plato’s philosophy.
Earlier in the Republic, Plato makes a notable argument in using the examples of the Dreamers. Plato distinguishes three different objects of reality: knowledge, belief, and nescience (476c 2-7). Here, the object of belief is considered to be ‘semi real’ because there is no conception of the belief, merely an experience of it. It is interesting for Plato to make the claim that it is even possible for something to be ‘semi real,’ as if the becoming of existence undertakes the process of alteration. Coming to be is not a process of change, because ‘change,’ of course implies the existence of a changeable property both before and after the adjustment. Knowing then that something that is coming to be cannot have properties preceding its coming into existence, it can be said that coming to be is not a change. If coming to be is not a change and for something to exist it must have properties, then there cannot be an ‘in between’ stage of existence and nonexistence; there cannot be ‘semi properties’ for a ‘semi existing’ object. This is inconceivable.
It could be argued however, that the said ‘semi real’ existence is not a process of coming to be, rather a static object in terms of its realness. If this is true, then again, any property of the object would be a semi property; and of course, by definition it is inconceivable to have a semi property. Also, the static object would have the property of being unchanging in terms of the level of its realness. Having this attribute gives the object a property and thus is actually real.
Plato also fails to distinguish between the person, and the Idea when he gives the example of the dreamer (476 c 2-7). A person may experience a form of beauty and have no conception of it. In other words, the Idea of beauty is independent of our failure to conceive it (or in this case, refusal to conceive it). The problem here is the failure to distinguish between failing to justify a belief and the Idea of beauty itself. A person can experience something overwhelmingly beautiful, not have a clue how to define it, and still have experienced it. Since knowledge requires the justification of a belief, the person, in this case, cannot have knowledge of the experience even though they and the Idea came into contact.
Plato (or Socrates) makes an interesting claim of the discovery considering Socrates’ message from the oracle at Delphi. In the allegory of the cave, Plato explains how people bound by their own ignorance are trapped until they are set free and become lovers of wisdom. It is interesting to note Plato’s use of comparison in the passage where he speaks of the prisoners on being able to see the shadows of the objects themselves (514 b-c). While it seems true that the ‘bound’ might not be able to fully comprehend the substance of the statues and animal carvings made from wood, rock, or other materials, it cannot be said however that they have no ability to sense the differences between the images. A four-legged animal could be distinguished from a tree, a fish, and two humans speaking, fighting, or making love. The ‘bound’ then have some experience of properties the objects project, even without the experience of the objects themselves through certain properties of the shadows and the echoes of unseen sounds. Therefore the bound have some sense of discernment between the different objects though this ‘sense’ is the only tool of which they have to discern. This mere sense, is of course not to be trusted and sometimes deceives, which is why the bound’s feeble attempt to define the objects and predict future events are more trivial than the knowledge of the object themselves.
In the allegory, Plato makes an obvious reference to the trial and death of Socrates when he says that the ‘bound’ would “grab hold of anyone who tried to set them free and take them up there and kill him” (517 a 6-7). The interesting inclination that Plato embraces however is an attitude that Socrates seems to have rejected. In Plato’s view, once the bound is set free and has time to contemplate the objects around him, he becomes enlightened (518 a). In other words, the lovers of wisdom become wise. Socrates would have rejected this notion because he viewed himself a fool (Plato’s Apology 21 a-d). It seems that Socrates would have rejected the claim of ultimate enlightenment because it ignores a distinction between philosophy and the philosopher. According to the allegory, a person set free, given the time to adjust can know. Where as Socrates might have said something along the lines of “the more I know, the more I know that I do not know.” The problem here is not philosophy, but the philosopher. Socrates understood that he was incapable of understanding all of reality, much less understanding all of reality simultaneously.
Another aspect that Socrates would have emphasized, and Plato seems to be unable to escape, is the need for the bound to be “set free,” as opposed to freeing themselves (515 c 5-6). When the man reaches the outer rim of the cave and contemplates real animals, humans, objects, and the Sun, he does so by means of philosophical reasoning. Is the means by which to contemplate real things the same means by which a man must be set free? It should be noted that anyone who inquires can reason philosophically.
In Plato’s passage on the divided line, he explains geometry as being contingent upon visible images (511 a), which must be assumed to proceed in mathematical reasoning. Philosophical reasoning is not contingent upon visible images and is not forced to make assumptions which is why philosophical reasoning is superior to mathematical reasoning according to Plato’s divided line. More relevant to the point at hand however, is the reality that philosophical reasoning can be done by anyone without prior assumptions.
How does this influence the allegory? If it is true that philosophy can be done by anybody, and philosophy is the means to ultimate enlightenment, then it would seem that anyone can escape; but they cannot escape, they must be set free. According to Socrates’ view, we cannot set ourselves free to reach ultimate enlightenment. Not because of the nature of philosophy but because of the nature of man. Our incapability to see things as they really are often keeps our reasoning from reaching truth. While it should not be said that we cannot reach truth by reasoning, that is illogical because it is a truth claim that is ultimately based on reason, it should be realized a certain doctrine of the human condition: that there will always be something false somewhere in everyone’s belief which they think is justified.
What then can set us free from this bondage of ignorance? If it is knowledge itself that releases us from this captivity of ignorance, then everyone can be set free. More than that, everyone has been set free and still chooses to sit in the place of their bondage ignorant of their freedom. If this is true, then both knowledge and ignorance are present at the same time in the same object applied to the same subject. This is of course impossible because if they were set free by knowledge, they would have knowledge of their liberation and their captivity would be voluntarily executed.
Another way to look at this would be to slightly alter the allegory in reference to a statement above: that it is not the captivity that forces the poor thinking, but the thinking that forces the captivity. This could be argued, but it is not convincing because it requires people to interrupt their own naturally false way of thinking to be set free. One other possible line of thought would be to say that knowledge would be made known to the captives before they were made captive. So as to say that even they have the opportunity to be set free, they choose ignorance because of their habitually bad thinking. This seems to be more convincing because it includes a person’s self-captivity of poor thinking, though they are still in ignorance.
Still it seems to be a large claim to say that because we can define Ideas, we can have full comprehension of them. This seems to ignore a dimensional limitation of human thought capabilities. While it is true that a person can have knowledge of an Idea, it is impossible to conceive all Ideas simultaneously, which is a limitation in human knowledge. It seems to be more possible that in reality, people cannot actually gaze upon the Sun, but by the Sun people can see everything else .
In the Republic, Plato uses many different allegories, analogies, comparisons, diagrams, and images. Arguably the most famous of these is the allegory of the cave. Comparing shadows to statues and the Sun to real things, Plato defines the Idea of Forms. Although Plato’s allegory introduces the superior relevance of Ideas to sensible things, the allegory shows some fallacies in Plato’s philosophy.
Earlier in the Republic, Plato makes a notable argument in using the examples of the Dreamers. Plato distinguishes three different objects of reality: knowledge, belief, and nescience (476c 2-7). Here, the object of belief is considered to be ‘semi real’ because there is no conception of the belief, merely an experience of it. It is interesting for Plato to make the claim that it is even possible for something to be ‘semi real,’ as if the becoming of existence undertakes the process of alteration. Coming to be is not a process of change, because ‘change,’ of course implies the existence of a changeable property both before and after the adjustment. Knowing then that something that is coming to be cannot have properties preceding its coming into existence, it can be said that coming to be is not a change. If coming to be is not a change and for something to exist it must have properties, then there cannot be an ‘in between’ stage of existence and nonexistence; there cannot be ‘semi properties’ for a ‘semi existing’ object. This is inconceivable.
It could be argued however, that the said ‘semi real’ existence is not a process of coming to be, rather a static object in terms of its realness. If this is true, then again, any property of the object would be a semi property; and of course, by definition it is inconceivable to have a semi property. Also, the static object would have the property of being unchanging in terms of the level of its realness. Having this attribute gives the object a property and thus is actually real.
Plato also fails to distinguish between the person, and the Idea when he gives the example of the dreamer (476 c 2-7). A person may experience a form of beauty and have no conception of it. In other words, the Idea of beauty is independent of our failure to conceive it (or in this case, refusal to conceive it). The problem here is the failure to distinguish between failing to justify a belief and the Idea of beauty itself. A person can experience something overwhelmingly beautiful, not have a clue how to define it, and still have experienced it. Since knowledge requires the justification of a belief, the person, in this case, cannot have knowledge of the experience even though they and the Idea came into contact.
Plato (or Socrates) makes an interesting claim of the discovery considering Socrates’ message from the oracle at Delphi. In the allegory of the cave, Plato explains how people bound by their own ignorance are trapped until they are set free and become lovers of wisdom. It is interesting to note Plato’s use of comparison in the passage where he speaks of the prisoners on being able to see the shadows of the objects themselves (514 b-c). While it seems true that the ‘bound’ might not be able to fully comprehend the substance of the statues and animal carvings made from wood, rock, or other materials, it cannot be said however that they have no ability to sense the differences between the images. A four-legged animal could be distinguished from a tree, a fish, and two humans speaking, fighting, or making love. The ‘bound’ then have some experience of properties the objects project, even without the experience of the objects themselves through certain properties of the shadows and the echoes of unseen sounds. Therefore the bound have some sense of discernment between the different objects though this ‘sense’ is the only tool of which they have to discern. This mere sense, is of course not to be trusted and sometimes deceives, which is why the bound’s feeble attempt to define the objects and predict future events are more trivial than the knowledge of the object themselves.
In the allegory, Plato makes an obvious reference to the trial and death of Socrates when he says that the ‘bound’ would “grab hold of anyone who tried to set them free and take them up there and kill him” (517 a 6-7). The interesting inclination that Plato embraces however is an attitude that Socrates seems to have rejected. In Plato’s view, once the bound is set free and has time to contemplate the objects around him, he becomes enlightened (518 a). In other words, the lovers of wisdom become wise. Socrates would have rejected this notion because he viewed himself a fool (Plato’s Apology 21 a-d). It seems that Socrates would have rejected the claim of ultimate enlightenment because it ignores a distinction between philosophy and the philosopher. According to the allegory, a person set free, given the time to adjust can know. Where as Socrates might have said something along the lines of “the more I know, the more I know that I do not know.” The problem here is not philosophy, but the philosopher. Socrates understood that he was incapable of understanding all of reality, much less understanding all of reality simultaneously.
Another aspect that Socrates would have emphasized, and Plato seems to be unable to escape, is the need for the bound to be “set free,” as opposed to freeing themselves (515 c 5-6). When the man reaches the outer rim of the cave and contemplates real animals, humans, objects, and the Sun, he does so by means of philosophical reasoning. Is the means by which to contemplate real things the same means by which a man must be set free? It should be noted that anyone who inquires can reason philosophically.
In Plato’s passage on the divided line, he explains geometry as being contingent upon visible images (511 a), which must be assumed to proceed in mathematical reasoning. Philosophical reasoning is not contingent upon visible images and is not forced to make assumptions which is why philosophical reasoning is superior to mathematical reasoning according to Plato’s divided line. More relevant to the point at hand however, is the reality that philosophical reasoning can be done by anyone without prior assumptions.
How does this influence the allegory? If it is true that philosophy can be done by anybody, and philosophy is the means to ultimate enlightenment, then it would seem that anyone can escape; but they cannot escape, they must be set free. According to Socrates’ view, we cannot set ourselves free to reach ultimate enlightenment. Not because of the nature of philosophy but because of the nature of man. Our incapability to see things as they really are often keeps our reasoning from reaching truth. While it should not be said that we cannot reach truth by reasoning, that is illogical because it is a truth claim that is ultimately based on reason, it should be realized a certain doctrine of the human condition: that there will always be something false somewhere in everyone’s belief which they think is justified.
What then can set us free from this bondage of ignorance? If it is knowledge itself that releases us from this captivity of ignorance, then everyone can be set free. More than that, everyone has been set free and still chooses to sit in the place of their bondage ignorant of their freedom. If this is true, then both knowledge and ignorance are present at the same time in the same object applied to the same subject. This is of course impossible because if they were set free by knowledge, they would have knowledge of their liberation and their captivity would be voluntarily executed.
Another way to look at this would be to slightly alter the allegory in reference to a statement above: that it is not the captivity that forces the poor thinking, but the thinking that forces the captivity. This could be argued, but it is not convincing because it requires people to interrupt their own naturally false way of thinking to be set free. One other possible line of thought would be to say that knowledge would be made known to the captives before they were made captive. So as to say that even they have the opportunity to be set free, they choose ignorance because of their habitually bad thinking. This seems to be more convincing because it includes a person’s self-captivity of poor thinking, though they are still in ignorance.
Still it seems to be a large claim to say that because we can define Ideas, we can have full comprehension of them. This seems to ignore a dimensional limitation of human thought capabilities. While it is true that a person can have knowledge of an Idea, it is impossible to conceive all Ideas simultaneously, which is a limitation in human knowledge. It seems to be more possible that in reality, people cannot actually gaze upon the Sun, but by the Sun people can see everything else .
Sonnet #2
Here is a sonnet I wrote after reading Lewis' ontological argument for the existence of God. Just to remove any shred of doubt, this is not condoning self inflicted death, but merely to explore the answer to death according to the Gospel.
Sonnet #2
When life has met the end of its short flight
What hope have we of life or death to take
Our bodies worn and nude embark to make
The journey borne and rude at death’s first sight.
The blind man’s end will make him push and run
The cliff from which he screamed at God to die
Nirvana brings no better cup to try
To fill and spill into oblivion!
There is a place I know exists. In sea
Of sand a man may dwell, and never taste
The touch of quenching drink, but know that he
Is from a place that’s free from baron waste
What joy of peace I have that when I roam
That I can die and then arrive at home.
-M.D.K.
Sonnet #2
When life has met the end of its short flight
What hope have we of life or death to take
Our bodies worn and nude embark to make
The journey borne and rude at death’s first sight.
The blind man’s end will make him push and run
The cliff from which he screamed at God to die
Nirvana brings no better cup to try
To fill and spill into oblivion!
There is a place I know exists. In sea
Of sand a man may dwell, and never taste
The touch of quenching drink, but know that he
Is from a place that’s free from baron waste
What joy of peace I have that when I roam
That I can die and then arrive at home.
-M.D.K.
The Sleeping Bride
There is very little of a poet inside of the hand that wrote this miserable sonnet. Yet, it is the first sonnet I have ever written.
The Sleeping Bride
A life to live in fear of faith
Could not achieve a grace which met
A life to pay receiving debt
His love, His grace, His truth, then scathed
The Maker shown; a truth forgot
A sleeping bride in slumber white
Now they are dreaming in the light
A death of man which sin had wrought.
Is there hope to see His face?
To blot the blotch that once had stained
Can there be receiving grace?
The death of sin that god had pained
Awake! O bride, now hear his call
And heed His name, the Lord of all!
-M.D.K.
The Sleeping Bride
A life to live in fear of faith
Could not achieve a grace which met
A life to pay receiving debt
His love, His grace, His truth, then scathed
The Maker shown; a truth forgot
A sleeping bride in slumber white
Now they are dreaming in the light
A death of man which sin had wrought.
Is there hope to see His face?
To blot the blotch that once had stained
Can there be receiving grace?
The death of sin that god had pained
Awake! O bride, now hear his call
And heed His name, the Lord of all!
-M.D.K.
Friday, January 28, 2011
An Essay On the Affirmative of War and Necessary Conflict
There are many claims by which Christians take the stance of pacifism, both theological and sentimental. But the number one reason why -that I have come to find- that Christians of a certain sect tend to fall on the side of pacifism is their discomfort of judgment; since God is the only giver of life, only He can take it away, and humans have no right to make the judgment that God no longer has any use or purpose in this life for the person on trial. In other words, humans cannot kill other humans because God can always use a person, even in their most dire need of Him. It is fair to note that there are other reasons why the pacifist takes the stance at hand, but this is the argument I have found to be the most popular, and the most challenging.
If I have portrayed this stance fairly and accurately (as I believe I have), then this stance is false for two reasons. First, I will pose that in the instance of war, self-defense, or capital punishment, it is not man that is making the judgment. Second, the statement does not correspond biblically with the responsibility given to us. We will examine these two challenges on the pacifist statement.
The first objection is an observation of the logic: If God gave man life (part A), then man cannot make the judgment that another man deserves death (part B), therefore man should not kill (part C). Although this argument might seem logical because God did indeed give man life and He is the only giver of life, but the problem lies between parts B and C. It is not necessary for man to make the judgment that another man deserves death (B) for him to be the one that carries out the judgment (C).
It is accurate to observe that the pacifist claims that it is humans who do the judging in any killing situation, when only God should. On the contrary, the judgment has already been made. In fact, it was the first commandment given by God after Noah exited the ark. In this passage, the Lord says that “Whoever sheds man’s blood, by man his blood shall be shed; for in the image of God He made man (Gen 9:6).” Because we are made in the Image of God, we are to shed the blood of the man who shed man’s blood. God is saying that this is the only retribution for a murder offense. Capital punishment was not instituted by man, but rather, created by God. Therefore, we can conclude that man does not make the judgment, for it has already been made; and if God has already made it, then there is no choice in the matter. The only judgment that we are to then make is whether the person on trial is guilty or innocent.
The second objection relates directly to the claim in itself. The statement that man cannot be the capital judge of the life of another man is clearly and dogmatically not biblically based. Two scriptures come immediately to mind; first is I Corinthians 6:1-4 where Paul writes
“If any of you has a dispute with another, do you dare to take it before the ungodly for judgment instead of before the Lord’s people? Or do you not know that the Lord’s people will judge the world? And if you are to judge the world, are you not competent to judge trivial cases? Do you not know that we will judge angels? How much more the things of this life!”
More specifically pertaining to the issue at hand however, is the passage in Romans where Paul writes that “if you do evil, be afraid; for he [the government] does not bear the sword in vain; for he is God’s minister, an avenger to execute wrath on him who practices evil (Romans 13:4).” I have heard the pacifist response to this scripture stating that Paul was using this passage to simply teach Christians not to be anarchists. While it is true that this passage implies that God instituted government, this is clearly not all that is said. The certain and specific language of the text leaves no room for anything other than the reader to acknowledge that we (the government) are to “execute wrath” on him who practices evil.
The second thing to notice about this passage is the very nature of the analogy. Paul uses the illustration of “bearing the sword,” as he also makes a similar illustration in 2 Timothy 2:4 referring to the church to “enlist as soldiers.” But one could hardly state that this is merely an analogy, because of the purpose and responsibilities of government. If taking the life of a human was indeed inherently wrong, then Paul would not have used the term “bearing the sword” just as he would have not said “you are enlisted as prostitutes for Christ,” or “you have been selected as drunkards of the Holy Spirit.” In fact, when a biblical author is describing something evil, they use illustrations that correspond to the wickedness of the culture (for example, Hosea and Israel the “prostitute").
Although it is sentimental to say “man cannot make the judgment to end another mans life,” that is all it is, a mere sentiment. As we have seen in scripture, God already made the judgment for us to protect the sanctity of life by one, requiring it of whoever takes the life of the innocent; and two, by protecting against those who would seek to destroy the innocent. Rejecting this responsibility will destroy the very thing that the pacifist movement wishes most genuinely to build; community.
In Christendom today, we have forgotten the gravity of the issue. For if the affirmative is right, then the pacifists idea is hurting and weakening the cultures of which it is most prominently accepted. But if the pacifists are right, then every single affirmative believer is then a murderer according to the principle of Romans 1:32.
I believe however, that pacifism is not a compliment to the Christian life. This may sound dogmatic, and that is because it is. With the knowledge of the of murders and mass genocide that is carried out every day by people who with racist motives, potential self-gain, or simply murder for pleasure, the church and all those of the Christian faith must realize that pacifism is not only a false belief, but that it also has catastrophic consequences.
If I have portrayed this stance fairly and accurately (as I believe I have), then this stance is false for two reasons. First, I will pose that in the instance of war, self-defense, or capital punishment, it is not man that is making the judgment. Second, the statement does not correspond biblically with the responsibility given to us. We will examine these two challenges on the pacifist statement.
The first objection is an observation of the logic: If God gave man life (part A), then man cannot make the judgment that another man deserves death (part B), therefore man should not kill (part C). Although this argument might seem logical because God did indeed give man life and He is the only giver of life, but the problem lies between parts B and C. It is not necessary for man to make the judgment that another man deserves death (B) for him to be the one that carries out the judgment (C).
It is accurate to observe that the pacifist claims that it is humans who do the judging in any killing situation, when only God should. On the contrary, the judgment has already been made. In fact, it was the first commandment given by God after Noah exited the ark. In this passage, the Lord says that “Whoever sheds man’s blood, by man his blood shall be shed; for in the image of God He made man (Gen 9:6).” Because we are made in the Image of God, we are to shed the blood of the man who shed man’s blood. God is saying that this is the only retribution for a murder offense. Capital punishment was not instituted by man, but rather, created by God. Therefore, we can conclude that man does not make the judgment, for it has already been made; and if God has already made it, then there is no choice in the matter. The only judgment that we are to then make is whether the person on trial is guilty or innocent.
The second objection relates directly to the claim in itself. The statement that man cannot be the capital judge of the life of another man is clearly and dogmatically not biblically based. Two scriptures come immediately to mind; first is I Corinthians 6:1-4 where Paul writes
“If any of you has a dispute with another, do you dare to take it before the ungodly for judgment instead of before the Lord’s people? Or do you not know that the Lord’s people will judge the world? And if you are to judge the world, are you not competent to judge trivial cases? Do you not know that we will judge angels? How much more the things of this life!”
More specifically pertaining to the issue at hand however, is the passage in Romans where Paul writes that “if you do evil, be afraid; for he [the government] does not bear the sword in vain; for he is God’s minister, an avenger to execute wrath on him who practices evil (Romans 13:4).” I have heard the pacifist response to this scripture stating that Paul was using this passage to simply teach Christians not to be anarchists. While it is true that this passage implies that God instituted government, this is clearly not all that is said. The certain and specific language of the text leaves no room for anything other than the reader to acknowledge that we (the government) are to “execute wrath” on him who practices evil.
The second thing to notice about this passage is the very nature of the analogy. Paul uses the illustration of “bearing the sword,” as he also makes a similar illustration in 2 Timothy 2:4 referring to the church to “enlist as soldiers.” But one could hardly state that this is merely an analogy, because of the purpose and responsibilities of government. If taking the life of a human was indeed inherently wrong, then Paul would not have used the term “bearing the sword” just as he would have not said “you are enlisted as prostitutes for Christ,” or “you have been selected as drunkards of the Holy Spirit.” In fact, when a biblical author is describing something evil, they use illustrations that correspond to the wickedness of the culture (for example, Hosea and Israel the “prostitute").
Although it is sentimental to say “man cannot make the judgment to end another mans life,” that is all it is, a mere sentiment. As we have seen in scripture, God already made the judgment for us to protect the sanctity of life by one, requiring it of whoever takes the life of the innocent; and two, by protecting against those who would seek to destroy the innocent. Rejecting this responsibility will destroy the very thing that the pacifist movement wishes most genuinely to build; community.
In Christendom today, we have forgotten the gravity of the issue. For if the affirmative is right, then the pacifists idea is hurting and weakening the cultures of which it is most prominently accepted. But if the pacifists are right, then every single affirmative believer is then a murderer according to the principle of Romans 1:32.
I believe however, that pacifism is not a compliment to the Christian life. This may sound dogmatic, and that is because it is. With the knowledge of the of murders and mass genocide that is carried out every day by people who with racist motives, potential self-gain, or simply murder for pleasure, the church and all those of the Christian faith must realize that pacifism is not only a false belief, but that it also has catastrophic consequences.
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