Here is the second essay that I wrote for my oxford tutorial which is a critique of Aristotle's metaphysics. Almost all of the content is based on Aristotle's Metaphysics book I or Physics book I. All of the references are in parentheses.
In philosophy today, certain fundamental aspects of Aristotle’s metaphysics are still used almost universally among the western philosophical world. Aristotle addresses many topics covered by metaphysics; from causation, form and matter, the existence of mathematical numbers, to God, Aristotle leaves few rocks uncovered. The fundamentals of Aristotle’s metaphysics, specifically pertaining to his theology, in comparison to popular theology done simultaneously have led to what can be considered the most important inquiry one could make.
There is no denying that Aristotle deemed it a sacred duty to pursue knowledge, if not for the sake of knowledge itself (Met. A. I). Even without any practical ends, knowledge is good for its own sake. Nevertheless, there are it seems, different degrees of knowledge in terms of their importance. The highest of these degrees of knowledge is wisdom, which is found in pursuit of first and most universal cause (W. D. Ross, Aristotle, P. 154). Yet, what is the ‘first and most universal cause'? What is the final cause; the beginner of the infinite circle of time and movement; what is the ‘unmoved mover’? Though his view is considered less than orthodox, Aristotle inevitably reaches the conclusion of a God as the first and most universal cause.
In his mind, Aristotle thought that because there are ‘better’ things, there must be a ‘best’ thing, which must divine. Ontological arguments among theistic apologists today are greatly praised and used often. Perhaps one of the most popular ontological arguments for a theistic apologetic would be none other than the famous (or to some, the infamous) C. S. Lewis.
Lewis’s argument lies mainly in his works Surprised by Joy and Mere Christianity where the argument is portrayed more as a theme rather than a concise argument given in a one section in either if his books. Since then, his modern admirers have condensed the argument to a more concise version.
The argument can be stated in a short analogy as follows; a man who is starving in a desert may never find food or water and tragically perish. Even though he dies, he knows there must be water and food; they must exist, for how would his body know what to ‘need’ for him to need it in the first place? Likewise, there is a need for a God. We see good things and better things, so there must be a best thing, or preceding things so there must be a first thing to cause the next things. Even if we cannot know the divine in any way, we can know that the Divine exists according to Aristotle’s argument.
As stated above, Aristotle’s view of God is less than what most adopt as a proper definitive. (1) God’s incomprehension of evil, (2) the lack contingency to the Divine, and (3) unconscious teleology which ultimately leads to a non-‘created’ genesis are all aspect of which most theistic philosophers would deny in Aristotle’s theology. To review the first objection, if the Divine is the ultimate cause of Good, and evil is a travesty of that good, then it would be reasonable to say the Divine has no relation to evil on any level, and therefore has no knowledge of evil. Aristotle accepts this view as it completely separates the Divine from the perversion of good (Ib. 25, 32, 26), but is it necessary for the distinction? It seems that if these definitions of God and evil are true, then God could still have knowledge of evil and its results without being acquainted with it. In other words, God can know what evil is without having it as any of God’s attributes, which would, of course, destroy our definition of God.
The main point of which the Divine serves Aristotle is to satisfy the dilemma of the beginning of time and movement, but this does not lead Aristotle to a creation genesis (301 31, 279 12 ff). This inevitably calls for an unconscious teleology, which has no foundation or basis in the Divine even though God caused the infinite loop of time and movement. Aristotle’s notion of God seems to satisfy the void of the origin of space, but why does it not apply elsewhere? According to the concept of the first cause, would not the origin of sensible things also need an unmoved mover? Furthermore, it seems that if there were no purpose, meaning or intent, or rational behind the genesis of sensible things, then indeed reality would imply a ‘matter over mind’ state of hierarchy. If mindless matter is all there is, then the mindless is all there is, and therefore philosophy and the very rational logic used by Aristotle could not be trusted. This would mean that matter is superior to mind (if the mind would exist at all) and would imply observational science of sensible things superior to a prior knowledge, which would certainly not be excepted by Aristotelian standards, and would provide no presupposition basis for those sciences.
Aristotle further argues that the Divine is not concerned with any “practical interests in the world” because any of these practical interests would “detract from His perfection” (W. D. Ross, Aristotle, Page 184). Aristotle’s God must be perfect, and thus separated from any imperfection at all costs, but why must God not involve Himself with this world in a way that brings it closer to perfection, to be separated from imperfection? Hardly any rationally thinking human being would deny the imperfect state of which mankind lives in, which would suggest that God is not at work in the world. However, if God is really perfect, and He is all powerful (which seems to be an attribute Aristotle would deny) then must not he make this world perfect at some point in time by virtue of His perfection; must not He have a devised plan to make the imperfect perfect, and thus everything He does is for a greater end? And if He is not all powerful (in spite of His status as the unmoved mover), then must not He try to make the imperfect perfect and fail in the attempt; all this by virtue of His perfection?
Aristotle’s God certainly did satisfy the need for which he saw, but it is worth inquiry to why many other philosophers would deem his God is too narrow. We can look to the gospel account of Saint John as a comparison of a widely held belief. In the first verse of the first chapter that St. John wrote to the Gnostics, the author says that “In the beginning was the logos, and the logos was with God and the logos was God. He was with God in the beginning.” Then St. John goes on to claim something that Aristotle would have immediately rejected; “…He (Logos/God) was in the world, and the world was made through Him, and the world did not know Him. He came to His own, and His own did not receive Him.” To believe the view that not only does God dabble in the practicalities of this world but actually became one of this world, is to believe in a much different God then the God Aristotle produces. Aristotle did not hold the same theory of Forms as Plato did, and this belief written in the Christian gospels seem to imply them. According to the theory of Forms, an Idea is (1) everything essential for the object to be and (2) a perfect being of the object, then would not this Idea of humanness be a God-like being? If this theory of Forms is correct, then whatever (or whoever) this Idea of humanness is might not be so different from humans. Is it not essential to humanity to be a person? And to be a person, one must be capable of rational thought? If this is true, then the Idea of humanness must be a person, the object of whose Image humans reflect.
Alas, the reflection cannot see the object in the same way a shadow cannot see the sun. However if this God were all-powerful, perfect, and willful, then he would move to fix all imperfections by virtue of His perfection. Furthermore, would He not become the particular so as to give knowledge of the perfect form? For it is inconceivable for an imperfect being to become perfect by means of itself; but it seems more likely for the perfect being can become imperfect for a greater ends.
In the gospel of St. John it is taught that Jesus the Christ was this being who came from perfection into imperfection. When He was asked to “show them the Father,” Jesus responds, “Have I been with you so long, and yet you have not known me?” (John 14:9). This obviously implies that no one can know the Divine except by the means of the Divine incarnate. According to the Christian gospel, man was created to bear the Image of God (Genesis 1:26); is this not exactly what a form does for its particular? What’s more, is that this Form must also hold dominion over, or be in complete compatibility with all other Forms in the same way that humans hold dominion over, or can be compatible with sensible things, not because He reflects humans, but because humans reflect Him (Ibid.).
The argument could be raised however, that a misunderstanding of ‘perfection’ is applied to the scenario in that the Form makes the particular perfect. Of course, if a red haired human were the perfect human, then the brown haired humans could never be humans. However, the argument merely states the particulars become ‘like’ the Form by knowing the Form, not that the particulars ‘become’ the Form itself. Therefore, the particular can still obtain attributes that are not necessary for it to be itself and still be a made-perfect particular.
If all this is true, what then is more important than knowing this ‘God incarnate’? For indeed the highest degree of knowledge would be the wisdom gained by knowing the first and most universal cause. In other words, what then is more important than knowing the object of which we are to reflect? If this is true, then surely it must be the greatest discovery mankind has ever made. If this is false, then it is certainly the greatest lie ever told. Either way, it
is worth much inquiry.
Thursday, June 9, 2011
Plato's Theory of Ideas
Here is the first essay I wrote for my Oxford tutorial. It is on Plato's theory of Ideas which is mainly developed through the Republic.
In the Republic, Plato uses many different allegories, analogies, comparisons, diagrams, and images. Arguably the most famous of these is the allegory of the cave. Comparing shadows to statues and the Sun to real things, Plato defines the Idea of Forms. Although Plato’s allegory introduces the superior relevance of Ideas to sensible things, the allegory shows some fallacies in Plato’s philosophy.
Earlier in the Republic, Plato makes a notable argument in using the examples of the Dreamers. Plato distinguishes three different objects of reality: knowledge, belief, and nescience (476c 2-7). Here, the object of belief is considered to be ‘semi real’ because there is no conception of the belief, merely an experience of it. It is interesting for Plato to make the claim that it is even possible for something to be ‘semi real,’ as if the becoming of existence undertakes the process of alteration. Coming to be is not a process of change, because ‘change,’ of course implies the existence of a changeable property both before and after the adjustment. Knowing then that something that is coming to be cannot have properties preceding its coming into existence, it can be said that coming to be is not a change. If coming to be is not a change and for something to exist it must have properties, then there cannot be an ‘in between’ stage of existence and nonexistence; there cannot be ‘semi properties’ for a ‘semi existing’ object. This is inconceivable.
It could be argued however, that the said ‘semi real’ existence is not a process of coming to be, rather a static object in terms of its realness. If this is true, then again, any property of the object would be a semi property; and of course, by definition it is inconceivable to have a semi property. Also, the static object would have the property of being unchanging in terms of the level of its realness. Having this attribute gives the object a property and thus is actually real.
Plato also fails to distinguish between the person, and the Idea when he gives the example of the dreamer (476 c 2-7). A person may experience a form of beauty and have no conception of it. In other words, the Idea of beauty is independent of our failure to conceive it (or in this case, refusal to conceive it). The problem here is the failure to distinguish between failing to justify a belief and the Idea of beauty itself. A person can experience something overwhelmingly beautiful, not have a clue how to define it, and still have experienced it. Since knowledge requires the justification of a belief, the person, in this case, cannot have knowledge of the experience even though they and the Idea came into contact.
Plato (or Socrates) makes an interesting claim of the discovery considering Socrates’ message from the oracle at Delphi. In the allegory of the cave, Plato explains how people bound by their own ignorance are trapped until they are set free and become lovers of wisdom. It is interesting to note Plato’s use of comparison in the passage where he speaks of the prisoners on being able to see the shadows of the objects themselves (514 b-c). While it seems true that the ‘bound’ might not be able to fully comprehend the substance of the statues and animal carvings made from wood, rock, or other materials, it cannot be said however that they have no ability to sense the differences between the images. A four-legged animal could be distinguished from a tree, a fish, and two humans speaking, fighting, or making love. The ‘bound’ then have some experience of properties the objects project, even without the experience of the objects themselves through certain properties of the shadows and the echoes of unseen sounds. Therefore the bound have some sense of discernment between the different objects though this ‘sense’ is the only tool of which they have to discern. This mere sense, is of course not to be trusted and sometimes deceives, which is why the bound’s feeble attempt to define the objects and predict future events are more trivial than the knowledge of the object themselves.
In the allegory, Plato makes an obvious reference to the trial and death of Socrates when he says that the ‘bound’ would “grab hold of anyone who tried to set them free and take them up there and kill him” (517 a 6-7). The interesting inclination that Plato embraces however is an attitude that Socrates seems to have rejected. In Plato’s view, once the bound is set free and has time to contemplate the objects around him, he becomes enlightened (518 a). In other words, the lovers of wisdom become wise. Socrates would have rejected this notion because he viewed himself a fool (Plato’s Apology 21 a-d). It seems that Socrates would have rejected the claim of ultimate enlightenment because it ignores a distinction between philosophy and the philosopher. According to the allegory, a person set free, given the time to adjust can know. Where as Socrates might have said something along the lines of “the more I know, the more I know that I do not know.” The problem here is not philosophy, but the philosopher. Socrates understood that he was incapable of understanding all of reality, much less understanding all of reality simultaneously.
Another aspect that Socrates would have emphasized, and Plato seems to be unable to escape, is the need for the bound to be “set free,” as opposed to freeing themselves (515 c 5-6). When the man reaches the outer rim of the cave and contemplates real animals, humans, objects, and the Sun, he does so by means of philosophical reasoning. Is the means by which to contemplate real things the same means by which a man must be set free? It should be noted that anyone who inquires can reason philosophically.
In Plato’s passage on the divided line, he explains geometry as being contingent upon visible images (511 a), which must be assumed to proceed in mathematical reasoning. Philosophical reasoning is not contingent upon visible images and is not forced to make assumptions which is why philosophical reasoning is superior to mathematical reasoning according to Plato’s divided line. More relevant to the point at hand however, is the reality that philosophical reasoning can be done by anyone without prior assumptions.
How does this influence the allegory? If it is true that philosophy can be done by anybody, and philosophy is the means to ultimate enlightenment, then it would seem that anyone can escape; but they cannot escape, they must be set free. According to Socrates’ view, we cannot set ourselves free to reach ultimate enlightenment. Not because of the nature of philosophy but because of the nature of man. Our incapability to see things as they really are often keeps our reasoning from reaching truth. While it should not be said that we cannot reach truth by reasoning, that is illogical because it is a truth claim that is ultimately based on reason, it should be realized a certain doctrine of the human condition: that there will always be something false somewhere in everyone’s belief which they think is justified.
What then can set us free from this bondage of ignorance? If it is knowledge itself that releases us from this captivity of ignorance, then everyone can be set free. More than that, everyone has been set free and still chooses to sit in the place of their bondage ignorant of their freedom. If this is true, then both knowledge and ignorance are present at the same time in the same object applied to the same subject. This is of course impossible because if they were set free by knowledge, they would have knowledge of their liberation and their captivity would be voluntarily executed.
Another way to look at this would be to slightly alter the allegory in reference to a statement above: that it is not the captivity that forces the poor thinking, but the thinking that forces the captivity. This could be argued, but it is not convincing because it requires people to interrupt their own naturally false way of thinking to be set free. One other possible line of thought would be to say that knowledge would be made known to the captives before they were made captive. So as to say that even they have the opportunity to be set free, they choose ignorance because of their habitually bad thinking. This seems to be more convincing because it includes a person’s self-captivity of poor thinking, though they are still in ignorance.
Still it seems to be a large claim to say that because we can define Ideas, we can have full comprehension of them. This seems to ignore a dimensional limitation of human thought capabilities. While it is true that a person can have knowledge of an Idea, it is impossible to conceive all Ideas simultaneously, which is a limitation in human knowledge. It seems to be more possible that in reality, people cannot actually gaze upon the Sun, but by the Sun people can see everything else .
In the Republic, Plato uses many different allegories, analogies, comparisons, diagrams, and images. Arguably the most famous of these is the allegory of the cave. Comparing shadows to statues and the Sun to real things, Plato defines the Idea of Forms. Although Plato’s allegory introduces the superior relevance of Ideas to sensible things, the allegory shows some fallacies in Plato’s philosophy.
Earlier in the Republic, Plato makes a notable argument in using the examples of the Dreamers. Plato distinguishes three different objects of reality: knowledge, belief, and nescience (476c 2-7). Here, the object of belief is considered to be ‘semi real’ because there is no conception of the belief, merely an experience of it. It is interesting for Plato to make the claim that it is even possible for something to be ‘semi real,’ as if the becoming of existence undertakes the process of alteration. Coming to be is not a process of change, because ‘change,’ of course implies the existence of a changeable property both before and after the adjustment. Knowing then that something that is coming to be cannot have properties preceding its coming into existence, it can be said that coming to be is not a change. If coming to be is not a change and for something to exist it must have properties, then there cannot be an ‘in between’ stage of existence and nonexistence; there cannot be ‘semi properties’ for a ‘semi existing’ object. This is inconceivable.
It could be argued however, that the said ‘semi real’ existence is not a process of coming to be, rather a static object in terms of its realness. If this is true, then again, any property of the object would be a semi property; and of course, by definition it is inconceivable to have a semi property. Also, the static object would have the property of being unchanging in terms of the level of its realness. Having this attribute gives the object a property and thus is actually real.
Plato also fails to distinguish between the person, and the Idea when he gives the example of the dreamer (476 c 2-7). A person may experience a form of beauty and have no conception of it. In other words, the Idea of beauty is independent of our failure to conceive it (or in this case, refusal to conceive it). The problem here is the failure to distinguish between failing to justify a belief and the Idea of beauty itself. A person can experience something overwhelmingly beautiful, not have a clue how to define it, and still have experienced it. Since knowledge requires the justification of a belief, the person, in this case, cannot have knowledge of the experience even though they and the Idea came into contact.
Plato (or Socrates) makes an interesting claim of the discovery considering Socrates’ message from the oracle at Delphi. In the allegory of the cave, Plato explains how people bound by their own ignorance are trapped until they are set free and become lovers of wisdom. It is interesting to note Plato’s use of comparison in the passage where he speaks of the prisoners on being able to see the shadows of the objects themselves (514 b-c). While it seems true that the ‘bound’ might not be able to fully comprehend the substance of the statues and animal carvings made from wood, rock, or other materials, it cannot be said however that they have no ability to sense the differences between the images. A four-legged animal could be distinguished from a tree, a fish, and two humans speaking, fighting, or making love. The ‘bound’ then have some experience of properties the objects project, even without the experience of the objects themselves through certain properties of the shadows and the echoes of unseen sounds. Therefore the bound have some sense of discernment between the different objects though this ‘sense’ is the only tool of which they have to discern. This mere sense, is of course not to be trusted and sometimes deceives, which is why the bound’s feeble attempt to define the objects and predict future events are more trivial than the knowledge of the object themselves.
In the allegory, Plato makes an obvious reference to the trial and death of Socrates when he says that the ‘bound’ would “grab hold of anyone who tried to set them free and take them up there and kill him” (517 a 6-7). The interesting inclination that Plato embraces however is an attitude that Socrates seems to have rejected. In Plato’s view, once the bound is set free and has time to contemplate the objects around him, he becomes enlightened (518 a). In other words, the lovers of wisdom become wise. Socrates would have rejected this notion because he viewed himself a fool (Plato’s Apology 21 a-d). It seems that Socrates would have rejected the claim of ultimate enlightenment because it ignores a distinction between philosophy and the philosopher. According to the allegory, a person set free, given the time to adjust can know. Where as Socrates might have said something along the lines of “the more I know, the more I know that I do not know.” The problem here is not philosophy, but the philosopher. Socrates understood that he was incapable of understanding all of reality, much less understanding all of reality simultaneously.
Another aspect that Socrates would have emphasized, and Plato seems to be unable to escape, is the need for the bound to be “set free,” as opposed to freeing themselves (515 c 5-6). When the man reaches the outer rim of the cave and contemplates real animals, humans, objects, and the Sun, he does so by means of philosophical reasoning. Is the means by which to contemplate real things the same means by which a man must be set free? It should be noted that anyone who inquires can reason philosophically.
In Plato’s passage on the divided line, he explains geometry as being contingent upon visible images (511 a), which must be assumed to proceed in mathematical reasoning. Philosophical reasoning is not contingent upon visible images and is not forced to make assumptions which is why philosophical reasoning is superior to mathematical reasoning according to Plato’s divided line. More relevant to the point at hand however, is the reality that philosophical reasoning can be done by anyone without prior assumptions.
How does this influence the allegory? If it is true that philosophy can be done by anybody, and philosophy is the means to ultimate enlightenment, then it would seem that anyone can escape; but they cannot escape, they must be set free. According to Socrates’ view, we cannot set ourselves free to reach ultimate enlightenment. Not because of the nature of philosophy but because of the nature of man. Our incapability to see things as they really are often keeps our reasoning from reaching truth. While it should not be said that we cannot reach truth by reasoning, that is illogical because it is a truth claim that is ultimately based on reason, it should be realized a certain doctrine of the human condition: that there will always be something false somewhere in everyone’s belief which they think is justified.
What then can set us free from this bondage of ignorance? If it is knowledge itself that releases us from this captivity of ignorance, then everyone can be set free. More than that, everyone has been set free and still chooses to sit in the place of their bondage ignorant of their freedom. If this is true, then both knowledge and ignorance are present at the same time in the same object applied to the same subject. This is of course impossible because if they were set free by knowledge, they would have knowledge of their liberation and their captivity would be voluntarily executed.
Another way to look at this would be to slightly alter the allegory in reference to a statement above: that it is not the captivity that forces the poor thinking, but the thinking that forces the captivity. This could be argued, but it is not convincing because it requires people to interrupt their own naturally false way of thinking to be set free. One other possible line of thought would be to say that knowledge would be made known to the captives before they were made captive. So as to say that even they have the opportunity to be set free, they choose ignorance because of their habitually bad thinking. This seems to be more convincing because it includes a person’s self-captivity of poor thinking, though they are still in ignorance.
Still it seems to be a large claim to say that because we can define Ideas, we can have full comprehension of them. This seems to ignore a dimensional limitation of human thought capabilities. While it is true that a person can have knowledge of an Idea, it is impossible to conceive all Ideas simultaneously, which is a limitation in human knowledge. It seems to be more possible that in reality, people cannot actually gaze upon the Sun, but by the Sun people can see everything else .
Sonnet #2
Here is a sonnet I wrote after reading Lewis' ontological argument for the existence of God. Just to remove any shred of doubt, this is not condoning self inflicted death, but merely to explore the answer to death according to the Gospel.
Sonnet #2
When life has met the end of its short flight
What hope have we of life or death to take
Our bodies worn and nude embark to make
The journey borne and rude at death’s first sight.
The blind man’s end will make him push and run
The cliff from which he screamed at God to die
Nirvana brings no better cup to try
To fill and spill into oblivion!
There is a place I know exists. In sea
Of sand a man may dwell, and never taste
The touch of quenching drink, but know that he
Is from a place that’s free from baron waste
What joy of peace I have that when I roam
That I can die and then arrive at home.
-M.D.K.
Sonnet #2
When life has met the end of its short flight
What hope have we of life or death to take
Our bodies worn and nude embark to make
The journey borne and rude at death’s first sight.
The blind man’s end will make him push and run
The cliff from which he screamed at God to die
Nirvana brings no better cup to try
To fill and spill into oblivion!
There is a place I know exists. In sea
Of sand a man may dwell, and never taste
The touch of quenching drink, but know that he
Is from a place that’s free from baron waste
What joy of peace I have that when I roam
That I can die and then arrive at home.
-M.D.K.
The Sleeping Bride
There is very little of a poet inside of the hand that wrote this miserable sonnet. Yet, it is the first sonnet I have ever written.
The Sleeping Bride
A life to live in fear of faith
Could not achieve a grace which met
A life to pay receiving debt
His love, His grace, His truth, then scathed
The Maker shown; a truth forgot
A sleeping bride in slumber white
Now they are dreaming in the light
A death of man which sin had wrought.
Is there hope to see His face?
To blot the blotch that once had stained
Can there be receiving grace?
The death of sin that god had pained
Awake! O bride, now hear his call
And heed His name, the Lord of all!
-M.D.K.
The Sleeping Bride
A life to live in fear of faith
Could not achieve a grace which met
A life to pay receiving debt
His love, His grace, His truth, then scathed
The Maker shown; a truth forgot
A sleeping bride in slumber white
Now they are dreaming in the light
A death of man which sin had wrought.
Is there hope to see His face?
To blot the blotch that once had stained
Can there be receiving grace?
The death of sin that god had pained
Awake! O bride, now hear his call
And heed His name, the Lord of all!
-M.D.K.
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